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A B S T R A C T
Tropical peatland suffers from rapid degradation due to expansion of palm oil plantations. In Indonesia,
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) have an important role in peatland protection. This
paper discusses the implications of responsibilization in the relation between advocacy and service ENGOs in the
context of tropical peatland protection and the expansion of palm oil in Sumatra, Indonesia. Drawing on the
scholarly discussion on responsibilization in environmental management we show that responsibilization in
peatland protection increases distrust among the ENGOs by generating a diversity of actors with different ma-
terial support, burdens and principles of work, and even polarized opposition between the networks. Such
distrust has a bearing on the effect of the actions, networks, and material support of advocacy and service
ENGOs. Advocacy ENGOs share similar interests with their donors, which allow them to perform their expected
actions autonomously, while service ENGOs are more dependent on donors' programmes and aims. The research
utilized methods such as face-to-face semi-structured interviews with advocacy and service ENGOs, state and
non-state actors, palm oil farmers, palm oil associations and three leaders of local communities, combined with
participant observation. We argue that responsibilization should be explored case by case because different
responsibilization processes lead to differing burdens among different types of ENGOs. Contrary to expectations,
responsibilization in peatland protection may thus decrease the possibilities for peatland protection in the area.
1. Introduction
Tropical peatland is a habitat with a large amount of carbon (70 GT)
and different flora and fauna (Miettinen et al., 2012a; Koh et al., 2011)
and Indonesia has the largest area of peatland in Southeast Asia (Page
et al., 2011). However, the habitat is under threat due to the activities
of the mono-agriculture industry, with palm oil as the main crop based
on high international demand for the product (Hamilton-Hart, 2015; Li,
2018). For example, in 2016, 10.25 million tons of Indonesian CPO
(Crude Palm Oil) was exported to India, followed by the European
Union and China which accounted for approximately 6.6 and 5.1 mil-
lion tons, respectively (Varqa, 2017). In 2010, approximately 10% of
the Indonesian tropical peatland area had been converted to palm oil
plantation, with Sumatra having the greatest area of conversion at
around 1.0 million hectares; it was predicted that by 2020 the area
under oil palm would have increased by between 20 and 25% to around
4.0 million hectares (Miettinen et al., 2012b). Riau province has the
largest area of tropical peatlands in the country. Around 4.1 million
hectares of Riau province is peat bog (Wetlands International
Indonesia, 2005). At the same time, 2.3 million hectares of palm oil
plantation exist in the region and of these, 25% are located on peatland
(Miettinen et al., 2012b: 9). However, the real number of palm oil
plantations could be higher because many smallholder farms are not
covered by the statistics. The region with its massive land-use change is
vulnerable to peat fires and forest degradation, and thus to high carbon
emissions (Purnomo et al., 2019).
In Indonesia, environmental NGOs (ENGOs) have an important role
to play in the protection of tropical peatlands from the palm oil and
timber industries. In Riau, the location of this research, 50 ENGOs
under six consortia, have actively been involved in tropical peatland
protection for around two decades. The advocacy ENGOs apply ad-
vocation strategies which include civil lawsuit action, lobbying, and
pressuring the decision-making processes. Others, which we will call
service ENGOs, work with service-delivery activities, for example,
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community empowerment and development.
This article explores the ENGOs' role in peatland protection by
looking at their actions, networks and material support. It adopts the
responsibilization concept (Erbaugh, 2019; Mustalahti et al., 2020) to
explore how donors' involvement in transferring the duties of the state
to the ENGOs has an effect on the relationships between the ENGOs in
peatland protection. Responsibilization as a conceptual framework re-
fers to the processes of “rendering individuals or groups responsible for
certain aspects of their well-being previously considered the duty of the
state” (Erbaugh, 2019: 1). The responsibilization approach has been
employed, among others, to explore how in Canada voluntary organi-
zations encourage volunteers to channel their resources towards edu-
cating others on how to become responsible citizens (Ilcan and Basok,
2004). In the case of the Philippines, the ENGOs work on empowering
the poor, but often also extend their service to the political rationalities
of control and surveillance of “marginalized” people and biota (Bryant,
2002).
In the Indonesian context, the number of ENGOs has been increasing
after the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998. The number of NGOs
increased rapidly due to abundant funding from foreign donors to
support democratization and freedom to join political associations
(Hadiz, 2010). The NGOs in Indonesia are diverse and ideologically
divided. At the beginning of the Suharto era in particular, many NGOs
channeled government aid and programmes to poor or other vulnerable
groups which thus were dependent on the state (Nomura, 2007;
Aspinall, 2005; Nyman, 2006). Yet there were also NGOs that critically
engaged with the state, even though they had to accept the state
ideology (Pancasila) as the ideological foundation of their organization.
Indonesian ENGOs became a critical force in Indonesia in the 1980s,
which could be seen as the turning point in the history of ENGOs in the
country (Bryant, 2001; Eccleston and Potter, 1996). ENGOs formed an
arena that government did not consider politically challenging besides
that many ENGO actors were also from the middle classes and had
connections to the ruling elite (Nomura, 2007; Lee Peluso et al., 2008;
Tsing, 2011). For instance, the Indonesian Forum for Environment had
a close relationship with the Minister of State and Population for En-
vironment, Emil Salim, who also needed the NGOs, which was evident
from the meeting that established the forum in 1980 (Bryant, 2001: 27;
Nomura, 2007). Since the end of the 1990s, many NGOs have mainly
acted as accountability and transparency watchdogs and as an element
of democratization through aggregation, policy consultation, im-
plementation assessment and evaluation, and advocacy (Hadiwinata,
2003; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu, 2002).
Indonesian ENGOs have focused their work in environmental de-
gradation, forest fires, illegal logging, peatland degradation, climate
change, and unequal forest land distribution (Bryant, 2001; Thorburn,
2002; Lee Peluso et al., 2008; Lounela, 2015; Lounela, 2017). Some
scholars have discussed the ENGO network dealing with the judicial
review and show that a new political conjuncture had provided op-
portunities to reclaim indigenous rights to forest (Astuti and McGregor,
2017). Nesadurai (2018) has discussed the role of international NGOs in
encouraging a sustainable certification mechanism through the use of
the Roundtable Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) initiative (Nesadurai,
2018), while pointing out how globalized some ENGO networks are.
However, some other researchers have expressed concern over the in-
ternational trend, global donor demand, and northern influence on
ENGOs in Indonesia and have commented on their effectiveness with
reference to the lack of managerial, accountability, and advocacy skills
(Antlöv et al., 2010; Eccleston, 2005; Aviel, 2000; Antlöv et al., 2006;
Longhofer et al., 2016).
This study aims to examine the implications of responsibilization in
the relation between the advocacy and service ENGOs in the context of
tropical peatland protection and the expansion of palm oil plantations
in a regional context. In line with the special issue, we use the critical
perspective of responsibilization, and focus on agents, actions, net-
works, and material support. This paper is divided in five sections.
Following the introduction, section two focuses on development of a
conceptual framework of responsibilization, agents, action, institution
and material support, and distrust, section three discusses the metho-
dological approach of the research, section four presents the results and




In this special issue, the concept ‘responsibilization’ is understood as
the transfer of duties and work burdens relating to natural resources
governance to local citizens and communities by public agents
(Mustalahti et al., 2020), duties which were previously performed by
governmental institutions (Erbaugh, 2019). Responsibilization is an
“element of governmentality” (Erbaugh, 2019) as it works through
governance techniques or administrative and bureaucratic machinery
and activities. The concept is often used in connection with the dis-
cussion on neoliberalization since through responsibilization the state
seeks to transfer responsibilities to other agents to reduce the costs of
taking care of specific domains such as environment, health or educa-
tion (Erbaugh, 2019; 2) without understanding communities' resources
and capabilities to carry out these new responsibilities.
As an element of governmentality, responsibilization aims to make
organizations, consumers, people, and communities responsible for the
improvement of resources and for ensuring environmental sustain-
ability in a specific location (Mustalahti and Agrawal, 2020, Forth-
coming in this special issue). Thus, responsibilization turns individuals,
families, and organizations, entrepreneurs or business entities into ac-
tors that are responsible for their own actions in the course of taking the
responsibility for specific duties (Lemke, 2002: 12–13). Re-
sponsibilization borrows from theories of governmentality by pointing
to individualization in the processes of transforming the bodies and
minds of the people through liberal governmental technologies –
technologies of self – where people aim to improve themselves under
certain authoritative regimes. In advanced neoliberalism, people are
expected to be free and behave responsibly in terms of their rights and
also compensate for their lives and vicissitudes (Rose et al., 2006:
90–91).
In this context, the responsibilization concept brings into view how
these processes affect the relationships between different types of
ENGOs concerning peatland protection. In the Indonesian context, the
responsibilization framework has recently been utilized in research
concerning forest management and primarily community-based forest
management (CBFM) where the burden of forest management is placed
on local groups in the name of social forestry (Erbaugh, 2019). In the
case of Riau in Indonesia, donors transfer the duties of peatland pro-
tection and management to the ENGOs. In terms of service ENGOs, in
other countries as well as in Indonesia, responsibilization refers to a
situation in which some duties of government or donor agencies have
been transferred to NGOs, but they have no power or autonomy to
implement such programmes independently nor to modify them ac-
cording to their own principles. However, we note in the case of ad-
vocacy ENGOs that they have a relatively greater autonomy to operate
on their own terms while at the same time tending to transfer some of
the burdens and duties of peatland protection to the local communities.
Our research shows that transferred duties and work burdens do not
necessarily mean that ENGOs do not subordinate themselves as agents
to the demands of the donor agencies. Rather, these agents can act as
autonomous subjects as is the case of advocacy ENGOs, while service
ENGOs remain subordinate within the hierarchy of governmental
agencies, corporations, or donors, which makes them agents that con-
duct activities on behalf of company and government interests.
Similarly, researchers on responsibilization in environmental govern-
ance have discussed how NGOs govern their organizations in
R. Ramdani and A.K. Lounela Forest Policy and Economics 118 (2020) 102242
2
accordance with their knowledge, capacities and resources (Mustalahti
et al., 2020). Such NGOs also tend to arrange their programmes based
on their principles (Lemke, 2002; Rose et al., 2006). In other words,
these NGOs are expected to have alternative material support and ex-
ercise self-governance in conducting their activities and carrying out
programmes within the regime of new (neo)liberal governance of “free
societies” (Rose et al., 2006).
2.2. Agent, action, institution and material support of ENGOs
The ENGOs are classified into advocacy and service delivery in
terms of their actions, institutions, and material support (Jordan and
Van Tuijl, 2000: 2052). With institution, we refer to the ENGO net-
works, while material support refers to the funds provided by their
donors.
The NGO literature has shown how advocacy is conducted through
direct communication with policymakers, demonstrations and protest,
petitions, influencing news, and taking an active part in public hearings
to speak on behalf of a section of society (Tang and Zhan, 2008; Zhan
and Tang, 2013). Advocacy NGOs advocate the rights of citizens and
communities through investigations and civil lawsuit actions (Frank
et al., 2007; Nomura, 2007). On the contrary, service NGOs are agents
that work for the governments and companies and conduct actions in
the interests of their donors (Agbola, 1994; Purnomo et al., 2020). For
example, Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu (2002) argue that service NGOs
through their development and empowerment projects implement the
donors' environmental programs.
When looking at ENGOs in Sumatra, it is necessary to look at their
networks. Networks cover the relationship of NGOs with other actors
such as local communities, government and companies, as well as na-
tional and international communities (Eccleston, 2005). The networks
can be based on relationships that are hierarchical, based on colla-
boration, or based on funding sources (Eccleston, 2005). The funding of
the ENGOs can be generated from membership fees, income-generating
activities, public support, governments, corporations or companies, and
international donors (Batti, 2014; Tang and Zhan, 2008). The service
and advocacy ENGOs have different sources of funding or materials, but
most ENGOs mobilize funds from government, international donors and
corporations due to the political interests of governments and interna-
tional donors on environmental protection and forest conservation and,
more recently, on climate change programs. Corporations collaborate
with ENGOs through corporate social responsibility and environmental
protection programs (Antlöv et al., 2006; Frank et al., 2007).
2.3. Distrust between ENGOs
Distrust is fundamentally related to a conceptual understanding of
trust. According to Stern and Coleman, the trust concept has three
fundamental elements: trustors, trustees, and actions (Stern and
Coleman, 2015). Trustors refer to the first party, while trustees refer to
the second party. Trust means the first party (trustors) accept the
vulnerability and the behaviour of the second party (trustee) in actions.
In this article, the trustor and the trustee are used interchangeably to
represent either advocacy or service ENGO consortia depending on the
context, while the action refers to the activities and strategies they
apply. Moreover, trust means the trustor accepts the vulnerability and
behaviour of the trustee in the action (Rousseau et al., 1998).
Distrust means that trustors have a negative expectation of the
trustee's conduct (Lewicki et al., 1998), commitment, and independence
(Stern and Coleman, 2015; Lewicki et al., 1998). Distrust also comes
from doubt about the other's competence, credibility, and predictability
(Kasperson et al., 1992). Kasperson et al. (1992) argue that distrust can
derive from lack of knowledge, from reputation and from inconsistency
in performance. It is useful to discuss responsibilization in connection
with the concept of distrust since the transfer of duties comes along
with differing material support and different principles of work and
thus has an effect on the relations between the different types of
ENGOs. In this article we utilize this distrust concept by exploring how
it plays out in the processes of transferring duties in peatland protection
to ENGOs in Sumatra (Table 3).
3. Research methods
This research employed the methods in which concepts of agent,
action, institutions, material support and distrust are used to explore
the processes of responsibilization in peatland protection.
The fieldwork was conducted in Riau province, Sumatera, Indonesia
from 2016 to 2018 by the first author. The data was collected through
face-to-face in-depth interviews, observation and relevant documents.
The face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with 16 leaders of
ENGOs (Table 1). The informants represented both the advocacy and
service groups involved in environmental activism in the region for
between 5 and 10 years. They also represented the variety of ENGO
backgrounds in their consortia. Moreover, semi-structured questions
based on the conceptual framework were used to retain focus on the
topic and ensure the informants can express their experiences and
opinions. In some cases, NGO documents and publications were ob-
tained from websites, magazines and newspapers. The aim was not only
to crosscheck the validity of the information but also to support the
evidence based on wider sources.
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were also conducted with
other state and non-sate actors including eight administrative officers,
three local lawmakers, 12 smallholder palm oil farmers, one palm oil
association representative who also worked at the CPO Fund of the
Ministry of Finance, and three leaders of local communities (Table 1).
The goal of the interviews was to understand the political and policy
context of peatland governance, the expansion of smallholder palm oil
farmers into protected peatlands, and the experience of local commu-
nities working with NGO programmes. Every interview took one and a
half hours and was recorded using a voice recorder. The data was
further transcribed and classified according to the key concepts: action,
institutions and material support, distrust. In some cases, the interviews
Table 1
Distribution of organizational actors in the interview.
Organizational Type n (Interview 2016) n (Interview 2017) n (Interview 2018) Total Interviews
Local advocacy ENGOs 1 1 4 6
National advocacy ENGOs 1 1 2 4
International advocacy ENGOs 1 – – 1
Local service ENGOs – 1 4 5
Provincial administrative officers 4 4 – 8
Local lawmakers 1 2 – 3
Smallholder palm oil farmers 5 7 – 12
Palm Oil Associations – – 1 1
Local community leaders 2 1 – 3
Total 13 17 11 43
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were repeated to crosscheck unclear information or to complete other
questions based on reflection. This is critical in qualitative research to
maintain the reliability of the data.
Furthermore, the first author conducted observations to capture a
general feeling and idea of the ENGO activities, such as active partici-
pation in the evening rally for child victims of the 2015 peat fires; a
member of an advocacy ENGO consortium organized the rally in 2016.
Further, participant observation took place in the March 2018 “Care for
Earth” campaign and in the related evening discussions that a service
ENGO consortium organized on a car-free day on Sunday morning. The
vice-director of a large environmental donor in Indonesia attended this
event. Likewise, the first author took part in a demonstration instigated
by another advocacy ENGO consortium in collaboration with some
student organizations working on wetlands and harmful electricity
generator development. The first author kept a diary to record these
events.
The first author elaborated and modified the data for analysis. This
approach was suitable for the primary data-gathering step due to the
opportunities it provided for the redevelopment of the conceptual fra-
mework during data collection and analysis. This activity also made it
possible to crosscheck the reliability of the data by contacting the in-
formants (Strauss and Corbin, 1994).
Lastly, the conceptual framework of agent, action, institution, ma-
terial support and distrust were used to analyze all data, including in-
terview transcripts, the diary on participant observations, and sec-
ondary documents. These concepts were used to analyze how advocacy
and service ENGOs conducted their actions, developed their networks,
received funding from donors, and how this all affected the relationship
between the ENGOs, communities and peatland protection in the area.
These concepts shed light on how different actions, institutions, and
material support led to the constraints and distrust between these two
types of ENGOs.
4. Results
The ENGOs in Riau province are grouped into six consortia. The first
five are categorized as advocacy ENGOs, while last is a service ENGO
consortium, as shown in Table 2. The main issue of concern for ENGO 1
is to rescue forest from the expansion of timber and palm oil companies,
while ENGO 2 focuses on environmental conservation in general as well
as on the relationship between humans and nature. ENGO 3 works for
equal land distribution and ENGO 4 campaigns to raise the environ-
mental awareness of communities. The only NGO adopting peatland
conservation as the main vision of its movement is ENGO 5, while
ENGO 6 encourages communities living near forests to adopt non-
timber and non-palm oil economic activities.
These ENGOs mostly focus on forest and environmental issues, but
they are also concerned with tropical peatland protection because more
than 50% of the Riau province is peatland. The ENGOs share the same
view that in order to minimize the excessive release of CO2 the area
should be kept free from oil plantations. Nevertheless, both advocacy
and service ENGO pay limited attention to the unsustainable practices
of smallholder palm oil farmers who operate 45% of the plantations.
Advocacy NGOs argue that smallholder farmers are working for “sub-
sistence only”, while the service NGOs believe that without any alter-
native income, local communities need to plant oil palm in the peatland
areas. Palm oil cultivation by smallholders or the corporations is a long-
running dispute between the ENGOs. Furthermore, the donors also have
different views on the issue. Thus responsibilization in peatland pro-
tection in relation to palm oil cultivation increases the gap and distrust
between the ENGOs.
4.1. Actions, network, and fundraising of ENGOs in Riau province
ENGO 1 has a large network at the national and international level.
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one of its members, which is vocal on the issue of natural resource
corruption. At the international level, ENGO 1 is a member of the Rain
Forest Action Network (RPAN) and the Environmental Paper Network
(EPN). The Asian Foundation from the USA and Siemenpuu from
Finland are the main supporters of its activities, such as investigation of
illegal logging and forest fires, lawsuit actions, policy advocacy, judicial
review of national and regional regulations, press release conferences,
and lobbying in support of divestment directed towards controlling
both timber and palm oil company activities.
ENGO 2 is the representative board of the Indonesian Forum for
Environment. The consortium is made up of twelve NGO members with
8 being legal assistance organizations. This NGO mostly uses lawsuit
actions to deal with the unsustainable practice of palm oil companies or
what the NGO calls “open war” action. Furthermore, ENGO 2 under-
takes demonstrations and lobbying to advocate on behalf of environ-
mental victims and to influence regional policy. Their activities are
regularly funded by the central board of the Indonesian Forum for
Environment, a member of Friends of the Earth.
In 2010, ENGO 3 was established mainly by ENGO 1 and ENGO 2.
Currently, a local board for this group exists in 130 village territories in
seven districts (Kabupaten) of Riau province. Their actions are focused
on documenting local indigenous people's knowledge of peatland uti-
lization and advocating on behalf of victims in forest conflicts with
palm oil companies. For example, a protest was organized by advocacy
ENGO 3 to advocate on behalf of local people of Padang Island in a
major conflict with a timber and palm oil group company. This ENGO
has organized hundreds of demonstrations at district, provincial and
central government levels calling for the activities of the company in
their peatland island to be stopped. The highlight for their actions was
when some local people and activists of Padang Island, both men and
women, sewed their mouths shut, which symbolized the death of social
and environmental justice.
In contrast, ENGO 4 is an ideological movement with a major dream
to eliminate land monopoly and privatization by timber and palm oil
companies in the region. They are a part of the alliance of agrarian
reform movements in Indonesia, which is a member of the Asian
Peasant Coalition (APC) and the International League of People's
Struggle (ILPS). This organization works in many areas with local
people to promote the cultivation of horticultural crops and vegetables
for income generation. At every international labour and farmers' day,
it regularly organizes rallies with its four strategic members in the re-
gion, as shown in Table 2. The largest demonstration organized with
other NGOs was in 2015 concerning the issue of forest fires to ask the
provincial government to decide on the emergency statutes for the re-
gion. Moreover, several threatening messages were sent to the mayor,
governor, and local lawmakers to open free health facilities for haze
victims.
ENGO 5 facilitates ENGO 1, ENGO 2, and ENGO 3 to broadcast their
programmes in a talk show called “Mahoni” which is an Indonesian
acronym for people, forest, and human destiny. The majority of ENGO 5
programmes are campaigns such as a green community, green eco-
lifestyle, and green spotlight directed towards raising public awareness
about the environment. Their mission is to support environmental ac-
tivism in Riau, educate the public about the environment, minimize
peatland destruction, support law enforcement against deforestation,
and monitor the activities of timber and palm oil corporations.
However, ENGO 5 generates most of its income from commercial ad-
vertisements and funding support from the main office of ENGO 5 in
Jakarta.
ENGO 6 is the only consortium applying a service role to the tro-
pical peatland communities and advancing a cooperative dialogue with
the government and companies. Its board comprises five representative
chambers including ENGOs, the Forest Department of Riau province,
timber companies, the Malay cultural agency (LAM) and Riau
University. There are currently 20 ENGOs working collaboratively
within the consortium of ENGO 6, divided in five groups based on forest
working zones such as Giam Siak Kecil, Kerumutan, Semenanjung
Kampar, Senepis, and the national park of Bukit 30. The programme of
this ENGO is based on the Belantara foundation project that is sup-
ported by the largest Indonesian timber and palm oil company group.
ENGO 6 freely welcomes government agencies and companies to sup-
port its programme.
4.2. Distrust and the transfer of responsibilities
The service ENGOs cooperate with corporations and do not see their
activities on peatland as problematic since the corporations mainly
work according to state laws and policies. In fact, the service NGOs are
dependent on funding from companies and government projects. For
example, a company group established an environmental foundation
through which the company group allocated billions of IDR to 20 ser-
vice ENGOs in Riau province. The leader of a service ENGO confirmed
to the first author that his organization received two billion (IDR) in
2018. The first author also interviewed a former employee of the en-
vironmental foundation, who confirmed the arrangement the ENGO
had made with the company group.
The advocacy ENGOs are against the acceptance of funds from
companies that they believe to be the leading perpetrators of defor-
estation and peatland degradation in Riau province. The advocacy
ENGOs argue that the corporations' donations hide their political
agenda to keep the ENGOs silent and delegitimize their existence. For
example, one of the advocacy ENGO leaders said:
(1) “How can I trust them [service ENGOs] if they work and have a
close relationship with companies. At the grassroots, our members
are in very violent conflict with them [companies] because they got
a permit to occupy more than half of an island in this province. And
all areas of the island are peatland.”
The advocacy ENGOs also argue that the programmes of the service
ENGOs decrease the effects of the peatland protection efforts because
they do not involve communities as participants in the programmes but
rather as objects of their projects. For example, in the case of a project
of canal blocking and rewetting of the degraded peatland around the
Giam Siak biosphere conservation area, the service ENGO consortium
donated part of the funds to a third party without consulting the local
communities on how and where the canals should be built. One of the
advocacy ENGO leaders said:
Table 3
Reason for distrust between advocacy and service ENGOs.
Trustor Reason for distrust to the trustee
Action Institution Material Support
Advocacy ENGOs Whether trustee actions have positive impact
to the well-being of local communities.
Trustee have overly close relations with
timber and palm oil company groups.
Conflict of interests of trustee funding from timber and palm oil
company groups.
Service ENGOs Trustee actions can be harmful to the
economic development of the region.
The legitimacy of trustee for having too
little support from the grassroots.
Political agenda behind the global donors regarding market share
competition of the vegetable, sunflower, and crude palm oil
(CPO).
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(2) “The projects they [service ENGOs] are working with now are not
relevant to the communities and peatland protection. They treat
communities as an object of their programme…”
Thus, advocacy ENGO has suspicions regarding service ENGOs' ac-
tions and subordinate position towards their donors. During the inter-
view, one service ENGO leader admitted that they have less freedom to
innovate because their donors regularly evaluate their work. For ex-
ample, one of the service ENGO leaders said:
(3) “My organization is involved in a consortium project, but it is
weakened by the rejection of some proposed programmes which
were judged by the donors to be beyond their expectations. We
regret this action because the rejected programme is important if
they really want to do something for forest and peatland con-
servation.”
On the other hand, the service ENGOs argue that the actions of the
advocacy group, such as demonstrations, petition, and civil lawsuit
actions, can harm political stability and economic development in the
region. One actor said that demonstration is an old lobbying method,
but it leads to too much traffic on the roads, violence or even self-harm
as the sewing one's mouth exemplified. The service ENGOs argue that
global economic interests influence the objectives of advocacy ENGOs.
This argument echoes the accusations by the Indonesian Palm Oil
Association (GAPKI), the CPO Fund of the Ministry of Finance, and a
representative of the police forces interviewed during the research that
advocacy ENGOs receive most of the international funding from the
global north and the USA, which have their own political and economic
interests concerning industrial-scale palm oil production. They argued
that the international support for advocacy ENGOs is related to the
competition between vegetable, sunflower, and crude palm oil (CPO)
producers, where Indonesia is the highest producer of crude palm oil in
the world and might take over other countries' share of the market. The
service ENGOs believe that the source of every international donation
should be evaluated to reveal if funding came from public donations,
global governance institutions, money laundering, or debt swap. A
leader of one of the service ENGO consortia argued:
(4) “For me, they [advocacy ENGOs] should learn more about how the
political interests of economic production in the world works. What
is wrong about our (partner) companies wanting to do something
for earth's conservation? So please do not be too confident that you
are a holy organization and others are dirty because you never work
with companies. Do they know about debt swap and money laun-
dering? Are debt swaps and money laundering good or bad for
human justice?
The service ENGOs argued that advocacy ENGOs such as ENGO 1
and ENGO 2 do have not much of a community basis at the grassroots
but conduct their actions in the name of the public interest. They sus-
pect that both ENGO 1 and ENGO 2 carry out investigations of defor-
estation and institute lawsuit actions on forest crimes, such as forest
fires, with limited support from communities living in and around
tropical peatland areas. However, according to the interviews, the ad-
vocacy ENGOs claim that they have the autonomy to organize their own
programmes and actions, which gives them legitimacy for their work.
The advocacy ENGOs make applications selectively to the donors and
receive funding if the applications are approved. For example, one of
advocacy ENGO leaders said:
(5) Yes, we obtain funding from international donors, mostly. But, they
[donors] give us the freedom to organize programmes and actions.
But the problem is that we are not allowed to share the money with
other NGOs outside our consortium.
The advocacy ENGOs can realize their programmes in the way that
they have proposed, but they are not necessarily able to fund their
networks from the same funding. However, it is not easy to show how
much they have support from the communities even though they also
tend to collaborate with the grassroots. The service ENGOs are suspi-
cious of the advocacy ENGOs' demands for maximum land redistribu-
tion, which also concern the areas under corporate concessions. They
say that this idea seems utopic since the companies have legal rights to
utilize the forest with the support of an immense network of connec-
tions to the central power of government. For example, one of the se-
nior service ENGO activists said:
(6) “I know their consortium and it seems they have a big dream about
the equal distribution of land which seems utopic….”
The distrust between the advocacy and the service ENGOs increases
due to responsibilization both by the corporations and by the donors.
This is visible in their suspicions over funding sources and whether
these are independent of donor demands and interests, doubts about
their legitimacy for the communities or the public, and of the effects of
their programmes on the peatland protection.
5. Discussion
5.1. Responsibilization of advocacy and service ENGOs
We observed that advocacy ENGOs use advocacy actions, such as
legal investigations, lawsuit actions, petitions and press release, as their
strategies to enhance peatland protection. They try to influence the
decision-making processes and regulations relating to forest and peat-
land protection through demonstrations, direct lobbying, public hear-
ings, and judicial review. In our case, there is considerable tension in
the conflict between companies and advocacy ENGOs with a real base
of community members at the grassroots. These community members
have used a self-harm action such as mouth sewing as a means of de-
monstrating.
The service ENGOs have a very different approach. They apply
community development and empowerment programmes to shift the
economic activities of the concerned group away from reliance on
forest timber and towards other activities such as mushroom and honey
production (see Table 2). In the case of Semenanjung Kampar and the
Giam Siak biosphere conservation programme, for example, ENGO 6
helped local communities to develop mangrove tourism, mushroom
cultivation and honey production. The case indicates that the service
ENGOs play the role of an implementing agent for the environmental
programmes of the government and companies. The service ENGOs
focus on economic development and empowerment of the communities
living in and around tropical peatland areas.
Institutional networking is an important part of the advocacy
ENGOs' work in Riau. They have both national and global networks,
and they relate with their partners as strategic allies and supporters
through their campaigns, divestment promotion work, and application
of international pressure to disinvest. Furthermore, global environ-
mental actors recognize them to be the oppositional force against cor-
rupt governments. However, the service ENGOs have a limited number
of partners which are restricted to the regional and national levels and
focus only on the projects of these donors. Consequently, it seems that
the service ENGOs have less capability to expand their network to the
global level because they are dependent on current collaborative part-
ners such as timber and palm oil company groups.
The advocacy ENGOs challenge the palm oil companies openly be-
cause, in their view, the corporations are involved in land acquisition
and tropical peatland destruction. These organizations also criticized
the government for having too little capability to control and monitor
corporations' activities on tropical peatland. In contrast, the service
ENGOs recognize companies and the government as their collaborative
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partners. Similarly, other research showed that the advocacy ENGOs
mostly challenge governments and corporations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
and Bondaroff, 2014: 1), while service ENGOs work collaboratively
with governments and corporations as their donors (Austin, 2007:
53–54). In the case of Riau, it is evident that the corporations do not
support advocacy ENGOs that work to correct their harmful business
practices on tropical peatland utilization.
Some advocacy ENGOs receive financial support from international
donors; for example, ENGO 1 and ENGO 2 are funded by the Siemenpuu
Foundation and the Asian Foundation, respectively. In some cases, both
ENGOs collaborate with the national government if the proposed pro-
grammes are related to their interests. It is interesting that, apart from
donor funding, some advocacy ENGOs mostly fund their actions in-
dependently through the cultivation of crops, membership contribu-
tions and advertisements, which is the case with such organizations as
ENGO 4, ENGO 3, and ENGO 5. In contrast, the service ENGOs depend
solely on funding from companies and government, which turns them
into their clients who agree to conduct several activities in response to
their donors' interests. Similarly, some scholars have noted that the
transfer of funding is more like a transactional relationship focusing on
specific projects with restricted goals and timeline (Austin, 2007).
From the perspective of the responsibilization discussion, the re-
lationship between advocacy ENGOs and their donors is equal; the or-
ganizations have the freedom to conduct any action necessary to pro-
tect the tropical peatland, and they are autonomous in their actions.
Their relationship is established on mutual interests, and the donors
have responsibilities to inform and guide the organizations which also
self-govern their actions.
The advocacy ENGOs independently fund their actions, as was ob-
served in the case of ENGO 3, ENGO 4, and ENGO 5. In the Riau con-
text, these self-actions mean that advocacy ENGOs take responsibility
for peatland protection and people's economic well-being, which actu-
ally should be the responsibility of the state. These ENGOs work on
those issues with minimal financial reward and sometimes at high
personal risk. At the same time, they also raise formidable opposition to
the incapability of the government to control the unsustainable prac-
tices and tropical peatland utilization by palm oil companies. Thus, the
advocacy ENGOs are struggling to sustain their own well-being due to
the lack of adequate financial resources, and dedicated activists run the
organizations without full-time staff and salaries.
Their situation differs from the service ENGOs that work based on
projects planned by donors. The relationship they have with their
sponsors is hierarchical because these ENGOs as agents do not have the
power to influence the programme, to allocate the budget, and to lead
their organizations based on their own knowledge and principles. The
donors require the ENGOs to work according to donor interests with a
limited possibility to realize their own ideas and actions. In other
words, although the service ENGOs are economically better off than the
advocacy ENGOs, they have less flexibility and freedom to pursue their
actions and plans, and they have a duty to carry out the programmes
requested by the donors.
Responsibilization, whereby duties of peatland protection are
transferred to the ENGOs, places differing burdens on advocacy and
service ENGOs and also affects their autonomy to act according to their
own principles. The different sources of funding they access and the
creation of a variety of networks means that responsibilization has a
large effect on the nature of their work.
5.2. Distrust and responsibilization in peatland protection to ENGOs
Different actions, networks, and material support have implications
for the distrust between advocacy and service ENGOs. For example, the
advocacy group, as the trustors, doubt whether the actions of the
trustee have a positive effect on the well-doing of the local communities
due to the possible political and business interests of donors such as
timber and palm oil group companies (Table 3). The local communities
also have less involvement in the programme arrangements which the
service ENGOs apply. The advocacy ENGOs have a moral duty to serve
community aspirations which can be implemented in the practical
programmes. Moreover, as trustors advocacy ENGOs detest how service
ENGOs receive funding from companies which sometimes are in high-
tension conflicts with communities. For example, the case of a peatland
island has shown that local communities living in the area are in a
severe face-to-face conflict regarding violation of their rights with a
company group.
On the contrary, the service ENGOs, in the trustors' position, doubt
the support and public legitimacy of the trustee (here advocacy ENGOs)
and the final goal of the latter's actions (see Table 3). For example, the
service ENGOs question the political agenda of the donors with regard
to global market share competition observed in the vegetable, sun-
flower and crude palm oil (CPO) production sectors. Moreover, the
trustors wonder if the actions of the trustee are sufficiently supported
by the public which would provide legitimacy for their actions. In this
sense, legitimacy refers to moral justifications for the environmental
and social actions which the advocacy ENGOs apply (Atack, 1999).
Another aspect is the trustee's actions towards land justice distribution
and their constant challenge to the business processes of the palm oil
industry, which the trustors by contrast believe is harmful to the eco-
nomic development of the region. The palm oil industry has contributed
to the regional income but also to reduction in land available for the
villagers' subsistence (Gatto et al., 2017).
These findings confirm that distrust occurs in a situation where a
party has doubts about the behaviour and actions of another. Moreover,
each has a stereotypical image of the other's actions, dreams, self-au-
tonomy, competence and credibility, and they are unable to accept each
other's vulnerability. This study, however, found a balance in the roles
of the two groups. The actions of advocacy ENGOs are vital for chal-
lenging the activities of the palm oil companies, and these NGOs con-
structively criticize the government towards ensuring better lives for
the inhabitants. At the same time, community development and em-
powerment programmes of service ENGOs are also important for im-
proved well-doing of local communities because there are only a lim-
ited number of institutions that empower them in terms of their
livelihoods instead of generating income from the timber.
Another noticeable issue is that most advocacy ENGO leaders, in
order to be deemed transparent, legitimate and independent, distance
themselves from interacting with service ENGOs. They mainly interact
with their own network and other advocacy ENGOs inside their con-
sortia even though they are personally familiar with service ENGO
activists. Kasperson et al. (1992) has argued that the lack of knowledge
of the other's reputation is the main factor for distrust, but this is not the
case in our study. This study argues that responsibilization increases the
diversity of actors and networks, creates polarizations and tensions
between the different networks and even more importantly, creates
distrust between advocacy and service ENGOs.
6. Conclusion
This paper has discussed the responsibilization or, in other terms,
the transferring of tasks and duties in peatland protection and how such
transfer has a bearing on the relationships and work of advocacy and
service ENGOs in Riau, Sumatra. The article argues that re-
sponsibilization in peatland protection impacts on the actions, net-
works, and material support of these two groups and leads to increasing
distrust between them.
Responsibilization generates a diversity of actors in peatland pro-
tection: corporation and governmental bodies transfer duties to service
ENGOs that ought to act in accordance with the formers' principles and
programmes that differ from the principles of advocacy ENGOs and
their donors. The contemporary peatland governance processes in
Indonesia show that responsibilization often occurs without the transfer
of needed powers, for example, the ability to arrange the programmes
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based on responsibilized actors' knowledge and principles. However,
due to the diversity of actors, governmentalities and contexts, these
have to be studied case by case (Rose et al., 2006; 98). For instance, in
the case of Riau, the advocacy ENGOs have more autonomy than ser-
vice ENGOs and donors give them the freedom to design their pro-
grammes. They are also openly critical towards the palm oil corpora-
tions unlike the service ENGOs. The two categories of ENGOs have
grave doubts about each other's principles, political interests, and
public legitimation. Thus, we argue that responsibilization increases
distrust by strengthening the different types of ENGOs in their different
orientations, principles of work and networks, in some cases, even
pushing for polar opposition to each other.
In terms of material support, the advocacy ENGOs have less material
support in comparison to service ENGOs. On the other hand, advocacy
ENGOs search for additional funds for their activities from crop culti-
vation, collaboration with the communities, and membership fees.
Some people work voluntarily without monetary rewards, which in-
creases their burden considerably. These actors question the generous
material support to service ENGOs and how it plays out in the political
and economic interests of the latter's donors. On the contrary, service
ENGOs receive generous funding for their activities and programmes,
which they obtain from corporations or governments. For their part,
service ENGOs have doubts about the donor interests behind the ma-
terial support provided to advocacy ENGOs. Hence, both kinds of
ENGOs, but even more so the advocacy ENGOs, are burdened with
multiple tasks and duties at the provincial and community levels. This
reflects what Rose et al. (2006: 90-91) call “advanced liberal govern-
ment” whereby the central strategy is the creation of freedom, that is,
people are obliged to be free and maximize their lives as enterprises and
act self-responsibly, as is the case with the ENGOs that take responsi-
bility in peatland protection.
In conclusion, responsibilization increases distrust between dif-
ferent types of ENGOs because it generates a diversity of actors and
different and even polarized networks that have different burdens.
These outcomes, we could assume, also decrease the possibilities of
these ENGOs to enhance peatland protection in the area. This outcome
relates to different ways responsibilization plays out between the do-
nors and different types of ENGOs.
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